Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets

dc.contributor.author	Pires, Cesaltina
dc.date.accessioned	2010-12-06T13:58:35Z
dc.date.available	2010-12-06T13:58:35Z
dc.date.issued	2003
dc.description.abstract	This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an established reputation in the debt market, the entrants’s quality is not yet known in the debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to interfere with the “reputation acquisition” of the entrant.	en
dc.format.extent	23121 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.accesstype	livre	en
dc.identifier.authoremail	cpires@uevora.pt
dc.identifier.pagina	pag 1-21	en
dc.identifier.revista	Portuguese Economic Journal	en
dc.identifier.scientificarea	639	en
dc.identifier.sharewith	Departamento de Gestão	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2256
dc.identifier.volume	2	en
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.peerreviewed	yes	en
dc.publisher	Springer-Verlag	en
dc.rights	openAccess	en
dc.subject	Asymmetric information	en
dc.subject	Financing costs	en
dc.subject	Predation	en
dc.subject	Reputation	en
dc.title	Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets	en
dc.type	article	en

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