Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem

Abstract

We provide the notion of Kantian equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium, and try to recover the efficiency of Pareto allocations within public goods (global commons) and external effects (like pollution) Nash 1950 a,b) provided the first solution to a non zero sum non cooperative game through a fixed point theorem Nevertheless, market efficiency is not recovered when there are either externalities (like pollution, or the global common problems), or common public goods Ostrom 1989 provided a solution in small numbers through cooperation in small lake ponds and lobsters aquaculture production and local water provision Roemer 1992 studied theories of distributive justice and came forth with a solution to global commons problem of environment and pollution ( 2019 Nevertheless, Roemer’s solution, while solving the global commons incentive problem, by thinking out of the box, and providing a new framework provides a too much collective solution We provide instead a communitarian solution, inspired by Christian ethics, namely Economics of Francis, Laudatio si which also recovers the global incentive problem, but provides a different politico economic perspective.