Kant vs Nash: Solving the Global Commons Goods Problem

Abstract

We provide the notion of Kantian equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium, a try to recover the efficiency of Pareto allocations within public goods (global commons) and external effects (like pollution). Nash (1950a,b) provided the first solution to a non zero-sum non-cooperative game through a fixed point theorem. Nevertheless, market efficiency is not recovered when there are either externalities (like pollution, or the global common problems and goods), or common public goods. Ostrom (1989) provided a solution in small numbers through cooperation in small lake ponds and lobsters aquaculture production and local water provision.

Roemer (1992) studied theories of distributive justice and came forth with a solution to global commons problem of environment and pollution (Roemer, 2019). Nevertheless, Roemer’s solution, while solving the global commons incentive problem, by thinking out of the box, and providing a new framework provides a too much collective solution. We provide instead a communitarian solution, inspired Christian ethics, namely Economy of Francis, Laudation si, which also recovers the global incentive problem, but provides a different politico economic perspective.